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Internal Secessionist Pressures and the
Dilemma of Pan-African lntegration
Agaptus Nwozor
Introduction
THE wave ofpo1itical independence lnAfrica ln the I I60sgreeted wlth great expectations and enthuslasm The
of power to indigenous crop of leaders was envlsaged as
opportunity to push the fortunes of the new states to
heights, especlallv 1n terms of economlc development.
political independence, in actuality, came with its own
Part of the broader leadership debacle in post-colonial A
states was the European creation of"master ethnic groups"
conferment of political power on them The effect of
arrangement was the enthronement ofexc rusionary politics in
bodv politic ofAfric an states wlth the result that e lites ofthe
groups outside the power equation
agitate for self-determination.
felt marginal ised and
Thus, all overAfrica, the elites got embroiled in conflicts
capturing state power. Ake (1981:128) avers that the
capturing state power is purely to advance their
interests. State power inAfrica has come to symbolise a
veritable means of creating and consolidating the material
being ofthe elites. Because ofthe extreme importance
state power on account of its utilitarian value, the contest
acquisition has been elevated to the status of war (Ake, 198 I
The premium attached to state power and the pockets of
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tlr.rt. dot the politicar randscape of Afiica have rnade the
.r,'lrievement of integration a herculean task.
'irrce the decade of African independence in the 1960s, African
''lrtes have not pretended about the relevance of pan-Afiica,
rrrlcgration. They recognise its imperativeness as a vehicle, not
'rrrlv to safegr-rard the fledgling indepenclence, but also to achieve,.r'txlorllic development in the race of anica,s peripherality in the
' krbal capitalist system. B,t the problem that has dogged
, , rllaboration towards pan-African intigratron centres on the issue
"l sequencing, that is, whether integration would be immediate or
'rrrdual. 
The argum€nt surroundinfthe sequencing of integration
rrrlrcres from the reluctance of African leaders to ielinqr_rish their
IroWers to a commonwealth.
lit'si6nali5ztion has been adopted by African leaders as their,t*tegy of ultimately achieving continent-wide integration. But
' r.piricill evidence shows that regionalism is inherentiy incapable
,,1 positioning Africa as a force to reckon with in the giobal arena
r , would continent-wide political integration. what hi consigned
l',rrr-African integration to the realm of utopianisrn has been the
rrr:rtinctive obsession withstate power amongst the elites. Not only
rhrcs it fuel internal secessionist activism, it tinds to preoccupy the
'tirtes with tasks of survival and sovereign uniiy in
,,,rrtradistinction to Pan-African integration.
l';rnoramic Overview ofTension, Conflicts
lurl Secessionist pressures in Africa
llrc transmutation of pre-independence optimisrn to post-colonial
;r.r;simiSrl in terms of Africa's development can be located in the
lrrlrrre .of the postcolonial African rtuter to operate above the
rrrrrstraifltS of primordialism. The ethnic cornposition of African
il,rlcs, as a rule rather than exception, is heterogeneous. The
lr,uragement ofthese diverse ethnic groups entails theinthronement
,'l ;rll the ingredients of fairplay, toleranie and patience. The state in-r.lr a volatile environment ought to be neutral and above ethnic
r lrrlacterisations. As Nnoli (200J:14) posits:
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Chad has been a volatile entity. There has been four distinct pha:;t' ,
in tlre Chadian civil war namely, 1965-79;79-82;1998-2002 zrrr,l
2005-present. The Chadian situation has trapped it in poverty arr
serious economic crisis. The Horn of Africa is not enamoured t'
the conflicts that characterise the Central African region. Eritrc
fought wars of independence against Ethiopia between 1962-9
and 98-2000. There were also the Somali border wars wil
Ethiopia and Kenya between 1964 and 1967 . Since 1990 Soml
has been in a bitter civil war that has led to the death of millions ol
people and virtual collapse of the state. Also, Djibouti r'v;r
embroiled in a civil war that was fought mainly in the Northcrrr
part of the country between l99l-94. The Great Lakes region hil,
posed the greatest challenge to African security having Sp3wl'rt'tl
the greatestmaze of conflicts in terms of magnitude, viciousnes,,,
spread and interconnectedness of the countries of this region rl
conflicts. As Nnoli (2006:59) observes:
Rwanda, Bttrundi, (Jganda, Congo (DRC) and Congo-
Brazzaville constihfte an internal conflict maze with a constantly
shifting epicentrefrom Bttrundi in 1993 to Rtuanda in 1994 back
to Bttrundi in 1996, and to Congo (DRC) in 1998. Some
3.Tmilliom people have died in this maze.
The same trend of conflict and instability characterises tlrt'
Northern Africa region. Sudan has experienced two civil war
(1955-72;1983-2005) and has currently undergone serious statc
sponsored ethnic war which has led to the official splitting of tlrt
country with south sudan becoming independent in July 2011. lrr
Algeria, a civil war has'been raging since 1992. Interestingly, rrr
most conflicts in Africa both sides have external allies whos,
support exacerbate and sustain the war with attendant diplomati,
corsequences. There were also instances of retaliator/ Support litr
illegal regimes and dissidents. This was particularly and brazenlt
the case in the DRC and Congo (Brazzavllle) wars. In the DIt(
civil wars (1996-91 and 1998-2002) both the government antl
rebels had backing from other states. While Rwanda, Angol;r
and Uganda backed the rebels that successfully overthrew tlrt
DRC government in the first phase (1996'91), there was ;r
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lealignment of forces leading to Rwanda and Uganda supporting
hew rebels in the 1998-2002 civil war to oust Laurent Kabila.
fingola continued to support the government in league with
ehad, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The preoccupation of most
Atiican states with the goals of regime survival and preservation
Of their corporate sovereignty in the face of mounting pressures
tom secessionist forces detracts from the imperativeniis of Pan-
African integration.
The Political Economy of Internal
Conflicts and Secessions
Even though the root of secessionist pressures across post-
Bolonial Afi'ica is traceable to its colonial heritage, the emergent
Afiican leadership undoubtedly deepened the contradictions of
rtnte-building. The emergent African leaders did not heed the
counsel of Nkrumah that rather than imperialism that it was
ncocolonialism that posed the greatest danger to the fledgling
Aliican states (Nkrumah, 1968:ix). They were obsessed with
ttsing the state power to cater for their economic needs. As Ake
(1981:128) puts it,'The indigenous bourgeoisie which took over
government at independence lacked a secure material base and
ttscd its political power for accumulation.' In this preoccupation
lltcy found allies in the retreating European colonialists. The
alliance of the African leadership with the West ensured that
lirrrope remained the centre of policy forrnulation for African
tlltes with the attendant consequence that African states served
lhc interests of the amalgamated classes than those of the masses
( K ieh and Agbes e, 2004:5).
l'herefore, the high premium placed on political power made both
lls use and acquisition a subject of murderous contest, pitting the
olites amongst themselves. As such, political contests were
olevated to the status of soft war where winning was considered
nll-important (Ake, 1981:128). The conflicts in Africa inhere
ftom, and centre on, the acquisition of state power. It does not
tRatter the nature of primordial forces invoked, or the end
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purported to be served by elite offbnsive towards the acquisitiorr o l
state power, the point is that secessionist pressures in Africrrrr
states are pure ly economic-driven.
The major casualties in the struggle for power amongst the elitt'
are the people and the states. All overAfrica internal conflicts har,,
become a permanent characterising feature of statehood. I'lrt'
consequences of internal conflicts are enormous. Apart frorrr
internal displacement and consequent dislocation ofthe lifestylc:;
many people are tumed into reftigees with attendant loss to llrt'
economies. As at December 2A09, about 27. I million people wcr,'
internally displaced by conflicts or violence worldwide with -l I
African countries accounting for 11.6 million internally displacc,l
persons (IDPs) or more than 40 percent (IDMC 2009:l).
In this paper, internal displacenient connotes the violent anrl
forceful dislodgement of a person or group of persons from thcir
homes or traditional settlements principally to save their lives or to
avoid the direct consequences of armed conflict, situations ol
generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural- or
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationll
border (LINHCR, 2009:5). Even though environmental anrl
natural disasters are recognised as part of the impetus tirr
displacement, it is conflicts with attendant human rights abusc;
that are implicated as the leviathan force engendering internrrl
displacement in Africa.
Secessionist Pressures and the Dilemma of Pan-African lntegration 165
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The distinction between IDPs and refugees lies in whethcr rt,, ,
remain within state borders. While there is interntrlr.rr,rt
recognition of refugee status and possibility of internittr,,rr rl
intervention, IDPs do not enjoy such wide latitude of intenrirlr.rr.rl
assistance. As IDMC (2009) coffoborates, 'the crucial difli'r,.',, ,
means they [IDPs] do not enjoy the same protection rrrrtl, r
international law as those with refugee status receive... Vtrrlrl ,
refugees, there is no specifically-mandated body to prorr,l,
assistance to IDPs.' But in recent times the tIN ?fld AU lr;rr,
demonstrated increasing interest in addressing IDPs. But thr: rrr, , r
potent weapon to address IDFs is to pool efforts towartl:; tlr,
containment or elimination of conflicts especially by steppirrl r1
all the indices that criminalise confl icts, including the &rroigrr r r rr r rr
of domestic elites and their international collaborators. ltr,
combined effects of internal conflicts manifest in tll
multiplication of people's miseries through lack of acceSS to llrt.rr
traditional food, employment, education and healthcare, antl ttr,
erosion of their human dignity.
The cost of internal conflicts to the African continent is enonn,,rr,.
as exemplified by its all-round underdevelopment. According 1,,,r
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Table ll: African Refugee population by UNHCR regions,200g
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cultural and litical tion andpo oopera integration AS a
not only for accelerated transformation and sustained
t but also to forestall reversal of the newthe
c
n:lirgees
Such a united front was canvassed as an effective
against neocolonialism (Nkrumah 19 68:259)
Internal conflicts in Africa retard development as efforrs ,rr,
dissipated on micro-sovereign issues of economic SLlrVrr,rr
containment of internal pressures, maintenance of sovereign r rrrrrr
and rebuilding of institutions destroyed in insurrecti,rr,rl
campaigns. Thus, preoccupation with these issues shifts l,;rrr
African integration to the baikground.
The Sovereignty Question, Regionalisation
and Pan-African Integration
Integration does not just occur. It is a product of conscr,rr,,
premeditated and well-calculated resolve io cede certain lSpet r ,
of a state's sovereignty to a common pool. pan-African integnrrr,rr
connotes a seamless 'interconnectivity amongst African stlrt,
economically, politically, socially and culturatty. rnis ideal whit tr
was propounded in the first wave ofAfrican independence i, rlr,
1960s polarised the emergent African leaders. T'his polarisali,,r,
was not about the desirability of Pan-African integration but rrr,
nantre of such integration, especially the issue of sequencirrl,





f1t *.u.rul factors such as structural linkages to erstwhile
$lorrialists, egotistic considerations and reluctance to relinquish
&f . sovereignty undermined an all-out co-operation and
fitegration in Africa in the 1960s. It would appear that these
Fgt,,rr also underpinned the seeming failure of several efforts at
ffilt,tutionulising workable frameworks for African integration.
Bso1,it. the objectives of the then OAU to, amongst others,
rt,,,irut. unity ind solidarity as well as coordinate and intensify
[0 opc'ration for development among African states, it failed to
Bttrrcrctise integration. The nearest it got was the establishment of
Ali,i.nn Economic community (AEC) through the auspices of
|,np,.,,, Plan of Action (LPA). The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA),
Wliit'h was a sequel to earlier attempts (OAU Summits in 1973 and
l9'/6) at integralion, was adopted at the 1980 OAU Extraordinary
Etttrrrtrit. LPA extracted individual and collective commitment
ftorrr African leaders to pursue economic and social integration of
Ali.ica through the establishment of national, regional and sub-
fep,ional institutions necessary for interdependency- (Nyong'o,
Jtiozl The signing of theAbujaTreaty in 1991 by the oAU Heads
nl State ana Gbvernment, which paved the way for the
extirblishment ofAfrican Economic Community (AEC), signalled
lltc cornmitment ofAfrican leaders to economic integration. Since
lvlrry 1994 when the necessary instruments of ratification were
rlepirsited with the Secretary General of the OAU and AEC, the
A li( "freaty has been in operation.
Itrspite severe criticisms by the World Bank that LPA was too
nrrrlritious and did not give enough roori to the private Sector, as
we ll as not conceding to reforms necessary in the public sector to
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stimulate growth, LPA constituted a tremendous effort ,rl
enthroning integration tl'rrourgh regionalisation. AEC is patter t r,', I
in sucll a way that its bLrilding blocks are the regional groupitr".
that populate Africa, ranging frorn the Economic ao**r'r1itv .l
West African States (ECOWAS) in West Aflrica; the Econttrrrt,
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central All'i, ,t
the Comrnon Market for East and SouthernAfrica (COMESA) rrrr,l
Southem African Development Community (SADC) in East ;rrr,l
Southern Africa amongst others. Paradoxically, these regiorr,rl
institutions have not had the required impact on the developrrr,'rrt
prospects of their member-states, neither have they, in ttrrt
significant way, integrated regional economies, not to talk of I';rt,
African integration. The primary hurdle for Pan-African econotrtt,
integration is the reordering of Africa's economic architectut.e t,'
make it sufllcier-rtly conducive to accomplish minimalist €collorrrr,
goals of industrialisation. This is so becauseAfrican economics ,,
at present, are characterised by:
Primary production, lotv share ofworld trade, low mandachtrt',1
outpltt and exports, low savings and investment, dominance ttl
ODA and low private capital inflow, rapid popttlation grotvtlt,
dominance of public sector vis-d-vis weak private sector, hetrv'.t
external debt burclen ... (CBN Briefs 2002/2003:35).
Despite the strides made by Africa in regional integration, it is :rtrll
very far from achieving economic integration. Even though thc i I
year projection through six stages which AEC sets for itsell t,,
achieve full integration of African economies might aplx',l
realistic, several factors such as monocultural structure ofAtiit;rr,
economies, seeming insolvency of rnany African econotnics ,r
exemplified by debt overhang, increasing contraction in llrt'rr
share of global exports which has pitched many Alrican courttr tr
in the grim struggle for survival, and the question of lrrt,
disposition of African countries towards integration, St;ttt,l
between these projections and their realisation. There has becrr 
'
deliberate trajectory away from political integration.
The question of political integration has been a volatile one.'llt,
al Secessionist Pressures and the Dilemma of Pan-African lntegration 171
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among Afiican leaders especially when it has to do
power. No African leader appears prepared to cecle his
dential powers for any reason whatsoever, including Pan-
integration. This underscored tlie seerning opposition of
of African leaders to the dictum of Nkrurnah,'Seek ye
political unity an<l the econotnic union shall be added
". The proliferation of regional blocs and the pursuit of
regionalisation through the auspices of AEC represent a
opposition to polirtical integration. Both the obsession with
power and generall incapacity of Afiican states are maJor
to integration. Integration is best achieved when there is
leader anrC all intending component untts possess
attribtrtes including sound economy, political
macrobconornic policies as wel1as sound fiscal
monetary policies (N dulo, 1992.5).
g the Diler mma of Pan-African Integration
there is no dissension amongst African leaders about the
tesration-
prognosis
there 1S no unanlml ty tn thelr
'were threefor action There
categories of adl'ocacy and aspiration about the trajectory
l)an-African integration: the Casablanca group consisting of
Mali, Guinea, ;'\lgeria and Morocco which advocated
di ate and total unio n of the Afri c an conti nen l; the Br azz'avi I I e
comprising mainll,r fbrmer French colonies which favor"rred
approach ant,:hored on regional economic and culttrral
as a first steJr.'fhe last group was the Monrovizt Grouption
included some members ofthe Brazzavllle Group anc'l otlrer
African states not included in the Casablanca groLlp.
group rooted for a graduali St approach The prep ouderauce of
towards gratlualism was wha undennined the lI11 tial
of a Federation ofAliican States or United States ofA liica and
cventual formation o f the OAU (now AU) (Manelisi, Francis
Stephen, 2000:1 ).
t
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For all intents and pulposes, the OAU was a mere organisation :rrrrl
therefore, lacked the basic integrative attributes to forge a utril,',|
Africa. The OAU charter expressly recognised the sanctity ,,1
member states' sovereignty and therefore forbade the Organisttlrt'rr
from interfering in their internal problems. It also recognised regittrr,rl
institutions as bases for eventual continent-wide integration. Botlr , 'l
these provisions: the reification of regionalism aS bastiotl ,'l
integration and the doctrine of non-interference, confracted the sprt, '
for Pan-African integration. Regionalism in Africa derives rr
essence from colonial primordialism: erstwhile colonialists usitrl' ',
combination of strategies, namely foreign aid, bi-and multi-latt'r rl
economic agreements and military and defence pacts, establislrt,l
larger than life influence within these regional blocs. In other wortl',
regionalism with its many pacts actively reinvented the Spectrc ol
neocolonialism as the erstwhile colonialists used and continue t0 tr','
its platform to direct the affairs ofAfrican countries.
The fact that regionalism in Africa follows the boundary lirr,
drawn by erstwhile colonialists underscores its inchoateness rtrr,l
seeming inability to transcend the realm of rhetoric. Indet',I
despite the long history of regionalism, progress towrtr,l
integration has not only been disappointingly slow but failetl t,
positively reverse Africa's dire circumstances (Guy, 2002:1) it
The explanatiol for this lies in two factors, namely, the naturt'r'l
African economies and subsisting leadership crises. There i r
basic belief amongst African policy makers and scholars that llr,
panacea for the appalling economic situation in Africa lies rl
regionalisation. This belief found concrete expression in the l()') I
Final Lagos Plan ofAction (FLPA) and the subsequent objectii"
of AEC. AEC is anchored on, and derives its impetus frortr
regional blocs known as Regional Economic Communities (RF.t t
In other words, regionalism, to AEC, represents the 'mt' 'l
appropriate sffategy to achieve autonomous, self-reliant and scll
sustained development' (Guy 2002:125). But this belief is faultt,l
in the face of empirical evidence: the reality of African ecoflol)rrr
experience is ensconced in its peripherality in the global capitalr I
system which makes independent developmental efforts a mirage
Year of
Creation
1990 1 995 2000 200 r 2002 2003 2004 2005
1994 0.2 0.1 0.r 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
1976 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1994 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
t992 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.r
1996 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.t 0.0 0.0 0.1
I 983 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
197 s 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
1984 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
19',l3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1992 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.'7 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.8
1964 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
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lll: Total Merchandise Exports by Blocs
World Development I nd icators 2003 : 3 24; 2007 :334
appear effective ln the face ofpoordoes not to be
economlc indices The maJor reas on for the oor showingp
African economies is their consignment to, and stagnancy at the
where its specialisation is limited to the production of
commodities (raw material or partially processed goods).
commodities in the intemational arena have been
ed by worsening terms of trade necessitating increment
trade volumes to maintain current levels of income (World
t Indicators 2003: 1 81 ; Guy, 2002: 124-25)
factor that has inhibited regionalisation is the apparent
e for supremacy among eadership and the maze ofAfrican
les thaT define inter-e lite relations. struggle hadThis
manifested in transnational cliques and deliberate state
aimed at undermining perceived enemy-countries' In
all the regions, African leaders have often contributed to
-regional through help lng their alliES to retain powercr1 ES
ward offopposition or he
instance, 1n Wes A
p1ng rebels overthrow titnateto
frica, a, Guinea and
legi
ts. For t Liby
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backed such rebels as Charles Taylor and Prince Yonnie Johtr:;"tr
Also, beyond the concerns of humar-ritarian miseries, Nigcrt,r',
initial involvement in the Liberian crisis through the ECOIvlt tt,
was motivated by the need to help the late Samuel Doe, who u,r'
General Ibrahim Babangida's (the then Nigerian military lerttl' rl
friend, from the apocalyptic destruction of rebels (Fatv,,l,
2003 : I 5 7- 1 5 8). Charles Taylor likewise was allegt',llr
instrumental in stoking the fire of rebellion in Siena Leotrt l,r
supporting rebel grouPs.
The pretensions of rnicro-patriotism and nationalism constilrrt'
serious impediments to African integration. These twin-attribrrt'
form the basis for the rationalisation of anti-democratic insurgettt r'
and anti-integration disposition of many African leaders. llr,
various military coups and autocratic regirnes in Africa beforc tlr'
cuffent wave of democratisation found justification in the high itl' ,l
of patriotism. Patriotism and nationalism have become malleablt ru
the hands of African leaders that they have assumed rr( \\
connotations: while patriotism has been so narrowly conceptualrr,, ,l
as absolute and unquestioning allegiance to the interests ofthe rr'rl rr r1
class, its component, nationalism, refers to fanatical protectiorr ,,1
territorialspheres of influence of the ruling elites. This mindset u,r
what derailed earlier affempts at integration and still th,1'
contemporary attempts.
Associated with the issue of Pan-Afiican integratiofl woS llr,
leadership qllestion of an integratedAfrica. In the build-up to eat'lr' r
attempts at Pan-African integration, there were palpable persorr,rl
hostility and accusations ofpersonal ambitions against the advocrrt'
of irnmediate Union govemment, especially the late Kwittrt'
Nkrumah of Ghana. The predominant suspicion was that tlr
progressives (the advocates of immediate Union govemment) wt'r
hiding behirid Pan-African integration to advance their persorrrrl
imperialist ambitions. Legum documented that the Head ofNige lr;rr'
deiegation in the 1960 Pan-Atrican conference sarcasticlll'
rernirked that If anybody makes this rnistake of feeling that he r:; ,
Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa, the whole pufposc ul
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Africanism will, I flear, be defeatecl' (Shivji 2005:7)' This
still predominates in contemporary tlnles'
Pathways Towar ds Pan-African
tion ln a Glot)alised world
gonlsm pervaded the ques t for Pan-Africanfear and anta that
ln perlo llowing independence 1n thethe d fo African
can e ex lained within the ambit o1' crlsls of personab p
rions. The emergen t African leaders
lng to d, for SC 1f
silvg State power AS
and gloup and secondl v,be covete firstly
ESS
N
llnportantly, for the masSC The SC emmg antrthesis to
gr'a was personalisation personifica tton oand
S
inte rion the
yerere captured the mindset of African eaders which
f
I
their failure to establish a Unlon Government for thc
continent in the followingwaY:
... too many ofus had avested interest inkeepinE1-zlfrica divided ' '
O n, 
" 
y or, .ril t ip ly n a t i o na I a nt h em s, n at i o n a I I I I qs a y d n 1.t.i,o 1a 
I
passforts, ,noit it th" (Jnited nations, and itrclivicluals entitled to
'21 gun s;alrttes, not to speak of a host of m'inisters' Prime
Min1srcrs, and envoys, yoi*ould have awhole army of powerful
p e o p I e w i.t h v e s t e d i nt e re s t s in ke ep in g Afr i c a b ol t:can i s e d "''
Afterthefailttretoestablishthe(JnionGovern,ry,zntatthe,Acc,t."a
S'ttmmitLf tgOS, I hearcl one Head of State express with.relie/
that hewas happy to be retttrning home to his c'ountry still Heacl
of Stare (cited in Shiuii, 2005 :8).
IS the perks of office influence and V1prl lepler; AS ociated wl rh( )
h lic offrces tha have formidably undennined Pan Aliicilll
tion Unfortuna te,lv, it IS the occLtpants of these sallle
irical that actually determine ner:essity or otherwi SEoffices the





kept Into tting lass de
notwtthstanding rts many bene fits, The decadc S o
ackboots 1n governance symbolised os;t decades of Patt-
co laboration for integration. Governmetrts 1n this era were
sulc African learlers have i t
I
Jitary
p ied more wlth survival and general leg itrimacy questton.
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The quest for Pan-African integration has always been powerr,l
by two factors personal activism and the framework ot
democracy. The immediate post-independence campaign for plrrr
African integration was motorised by such popularly electr',1
leaders as Kwame Nkrumah, Cheikh Anta Diop, Modibo Kcir;r
and Sekou Toure. And amongst these leaders it was Nkrumah th;rr
epitomised it: that was why when Nkrumah's government wrr,,
toppled by the military the ship of Pan-African integration kr;r
steam and subsequently drifted rudderless until it got stuck in tlrr.
sea of regionalism and later, globalisation. Guy (2002:12 tt
captures it this way, 'with the progressive removal of the purr
africanists from the African political scene, neo-functionalism h:t,
become the dominant approach and serves as the model for mosr
if not all, current regional integration schemes in Africa.' Nco
functionalists favoured loose cooperation and held that ecooonrrr
integration should precede political integration and that any for-rrr
of unity among any number of African states was in the riglrr
direction (Guy, 2002:127; Shivji ,2005:7).
The seeming hopeless situation of African states, some 50 yerrr ,
after, questions the wisdom of regional strategy of ne,,
functionalism. Both statism and regionalism have demonstrar(.(l
acute limitations in the task of positioning Africa in the rapaci,rr,,
global capitalist system: by their very nature they lack rlr,
necessary capacity to contain or ward off neo-imperialr,r
manipulations, oppression, looting and pillage orchestrated untlt'r
different guise. The achievement ofAfrican regionalism has bet.rr
scathingly summarised by Guy (2002:128-29) thus:
Many institutions for regional co-operation and integration were
created soon after independence in Africa. There are at present
more than 200 such organisations on the continent; more than
160 are inter-governmenlal and the rest non-governmental...
This institutional proli,feration has resulted in multiple
membership, duplication, a waste of human and financial
resources, and lack ofinter-instittttional coordination.
Even though continent-wide integration is superior to regionrrl
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1n terms ofnet gams, yet IE,gionalism cannot be disrn issed
a wave of the hand AS if it IS completely devoid of postttve
Ordinarily, the intentions regional isation are to provideof
market to the exclusion of others, protect the interest of
capital within the reglon and confer on rt advantages that
make t strong to compete around the world. A verdict on
regionalism 1n Africa has tulfilled its cardinal objectives
definitely tilt towards the nergative Shams 2005 :2 Cargill,
8) The two cardinal expectations regionalism namel Y, thatof
through economy
'scale, unleash advantages lnof economlc
domestic economles member-states and that it wouldof
lead to continent-wide integration have not materialised'
both as individual states and as re,gional groupings, has
lost its share of global exports. Efforts at regional
did not yield dividends because number of factorsof a
structural deficiencies, lack ofcommitment on the part of
leaders, absence of favourable conditions and lack of
integration leaders ln the reglons to serve AS the fulcrum
of the
of monetary and fi scal stabilifY.
major drawbacks to Africa's m
(
I
arch to integration IS the
between personal am and good: thebition common
perc eption tha power should be wielded for ts ownT
not AS an lnStrument achieve higher good the peop leto for
AS eradication ofpoverty, enthronement o better highe rand
of living, creatlon ofopportunttte for the full real lsation
people' S humani ty and SO on This parochial perception o I the
alue of power undergirds the myriad conflicts and
lnS ty that ha placed African state on the pre
f
ve
dustbin of failed states Regronalism IS patentlv incongrttcnt
contemporary globalised and why the E, TJ haswor1d that IS
glo
to smooth its integrarion efforts, sucking up every sta te
into the vortex of its union. Without the EU, the so-
than t did The mcreaslng convergence of states into a
bal financial meltdown might have had much more flar-
devastating impact on the economies of- European
tabili C p tce
( )IS an lntegral logic of globalisation As Ake 1 99
-) ')LL- 23
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observes,
It [globctlisationJ is about growing stntctural clffirentiatiorr
anclfunctionul integration in lhe world econonly; il is about
growing inter-clependence across the globe,. it is about the
nation-stale cotning under pressure from the sltrge o./
tronsnoliottal phenomena, about the ernergence of a glttbal
ntass ctthtre driven by moss advertising and technicul
advances in mqss communication.
Therefore, the continued relevance of states in our globalisr,r
world lies in their ability to increase their capacity in orderto r,,
big players in the international system. Statism or regionalisnr ;, ,
presently organised inAfrica lacks the capacity to provide the rrglrr
platfonn to confront or fit into the globalised world. As it r
Africa's combined economies amount to less than two percenr ('r
totalglobal income and 3.5 percent ofglobaltrade which is mairrrr
in the extractive sector (Cargill, 2010:19). And yet, Afiica r
strategicaily irnportant to the world on account of its abunclrrrr
human and natural resources. As Cargill (2010:20) avers, 'Afi.it ;r
has almost 40 per cent of the basic mineral resources requirecl rr,
fuelglobal industry, as well as 10 percent ofthe world's freshwatt.r
supplies and 15 percent of the world's agricultural land.'But trrt.
conversion of tliese distinct advantages to further Africrr'r
influence in the world arena has remained a very big challengt.
The pathway to overcoming these challenges lies in the reorderir'
ofthe domestic arena and the erection of the necessary frameworl,
for Pan-Alricn integration.
Conclusion
The Achilles heel ofPan-African integration for the past 50 years h;r:,
been the elite perception of the utilitarian value of state powcr
African elites covet state power and parochially perceive it irr
economic terms. In perceiving power in such narrow way, parr
African integration is seen negatively as a surreptitious strategy t,
undermine state sovereignty. Regionalism which the African rulin'
elites adopted in place of outright continent-wide poritical
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represen ts a clever alternative. While regional qt't'ttpittu's
useful pulposes, evidence has shown that they havt:
the continent closer to real indepetrdence as
dependence and liabilities ofAfrican coutrtries
integra tion is indispensable if Atrica's voice must
in the globali sed worlcl. In order to advance the cause
African integration, emphasis must be on democratisation
states. DemocracY will give power back to the PeoP
phasise personalisati power. Itde-em the on of S
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